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a b s t r a c t
A multiple-image cryptosystem is proposed based on the cascaded fractional Fourier transform. During
an encryption procedure, each of the original images is directly separated into two phase masks. A
portion of the masks is subsequently modulated into an interim mask, which is encrypted into the
ciphertext image; the others are used as the encryption keys. Using phase truncation in the fractional
Fourier domain, one can use an asymmetric cryptosystem to produce a real-valued noise-like ciphertext,
while a legal user can reconstruct all of the original images using a different group of phase masks. The
encryption key is an indivisible part of the corresponding original image and is still useful during
decryption. The proposed system has high resistance to various potential attacks, including the chosen-
plaintext attack. Numerical simulations also demonstrate the security and feasibility of the proposed
scheme.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
With the rapid development of information technology, secure
transmission systems have become the focus of many studies.
During the past two decades, a large number of image encryption
systems have been proposed after Refregier and Javide encrypted a
primary image into stationary white noise using the double random
phase encoding (DRPE) in the Fourier domain [1]. Due to the
capability of the DRPE to ensure the security of the data transmis-
sion and communication, this algorithm has been developed based
on different transforms, such as the general fractional Fourier tran-
sform [2–5], the vector power multiple-parameter fractional Fourier
transform [6], the Fresnel transform [7], and the Gyrator transform
[8–11]. However, most cryptosystems are linear, which makes them
vulnerable to potential attacks such as the chosen plaintext attack.
Additionally, many studies have only considered the encryption of a
single image, which can reduce the efﬁciency of the cryptosystem
due to practical matters.
To satisfy today's encryption requirements, double-image and
multiple-image encryption techniques have been investigated in
depth. Tao et al. [12] encrypted two images into the amplitude and
phase of a complex function. Liu and Liu. [13] suggested that two
images could be encrypted into a single ciphertext image using the
iterative fractional Fourier transform. Sui et al. [14] proposed a
double-image encryption technique based on the discrete fractional
random transform, where a chaotic process is used to break the
correlations between adjacent pixels efﬁciently. Liu et al. [8] des-
igned a double image encryption system using iterative random
binary encoding in the Gyrator domain. Wang and Zhao [15]
encrypted two images into one ciphertext image based on phase
retrieval and the phase-truncated Fourier transform. For multiple-
image encryption, Kong et al. [16] designed a multiple-image
encryption scheme based on the cascaded fractional Fourier trans-
form. Sui et al. [17] encrypted multiple images into a single cip-
hertext using the phase mask multiplexing technique in the
fractional Fourier domain, while Wang et al. [18] transformed this
algorithm into the Gyrator domain. In Ref. [19], Sui et al. modiﬁed
the multiple-image encryption scheme using the chaotic technique,
in which the security is considerably enhanced. In addition, as a
special case of multiple-image encryption, color image encryption
has also developed rapidly [20,21]. However, Peng et al. [22,23]
claimed that traditional linear cryptosystems could be vulnerable
when confronted with potential attacks.
To resist a potential attack, some studies have investigated
breaking the linearity of the cryptosystem. Qin and Peng [24]
introduced the asymmetric cryptosystem based on the phase-
truncated Fourier transform, in which the encryption keys are
different from those used in the decryption process. Wang and
Zhao [25] and Sui et al. [26] transformed this technique for use in
double-image encryption.
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The above-mentioned studies have improved image encryption
techniques signiﬁcantly, discovering and solving various types of
troubles while improving security and the feasibility of these
techniques; every step forward is also based on the predecessors.
We also found that the security of the cryptosystems proposed in
[17–19] would be more effective, and resources would be utilized
more efﬁciently than those proposed in [24–26].
In this study, an asymmetric multiple-image encryption scheme
based on the cascaded fractional Fourier transform is proposed.
Before encryption, all of the original images are separated into two
phase masks. A portion of them are multiplied into a one phase
function, the angle of which is transformed into an interim mask
that will be encrypted; the others are used as the encryption keys
to encrypt the interim mask into the ﬁnal noise-like ciphertext
image. The decryption keys are generated during encryption using
the phase-truncated technique and are not identical to the encryp-
tion keys, producing an asymmetric cryptosystem. Unlike other
asymmetric cryptosystems, the encryption keys are also required
during decryption, which makes the scheme highly robustness to
the various types of attacks. Simulation results and a security
analysis are used to demonstrate the security and feasibility of the
proposed method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the principles are introduced and the processes of encryption and
decryption are described in detail. In Section 3, numerical simula-
tions and security analyses are described. Lastly, the conclusions are
presented in Section 4.
2. Encryption and decryption process
2.1. Image separation
Before encryption, every original image is separated into two
phase masks using the algorithm proposed in [15]. Assuming that
the function f ðx; yÞ denotes a normalized image, we generate a
phase function expðiθðx; yÞÞ that is used as the ﬁrst phase mask,
where the distribution of θðx; yÞ randomly ranges from 0 to 2π.
Because the two phase masks can be viewed mathematically as
two unit vectors in a two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate
system, the original image can be expressed as:
f ðx; yÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
22 cos ðπαðx; yÞÞ
p
ð1Þ
where the angle αðx; yÞ denotes the relation between expðiθðx; yÞÞ
and the second phase mask expðiφðx; yÞÞ. αðx; yÞ can then be
calculated by
αðx; yÞ ¼ π  arccos2 f
2ðx; yÞ
2
: ð2Þ
Consequently, the second phase mask expðiφðx; yÞÞ can be
described by
expðiφðx; yÞÞ ¼ expðiðθðx; yÞþαðx; yÞÞÞ: ð3Þ
Therefore, the normalized image f ðx; yÞ has been separated into
two phase masks and can be expressed as
f ðx; yÞ ¼ expðiφðx; yÞÞþexpðiðθðx; yÞÞ
 : ð4Þ
2.2. Fractional Fourier transform
The fractional Fourier transform (FrFT) is a generalization of the
ordinary Fourier transform, which has been widely used in image
and signal processing techniques. The α  th FrFT of the signal
f ðx0Þ can be expressed as
Fα f x0ð Þ
 ¼ Z þ1
1
f x0ð ÞKα x0; xαð Þdx0 ð5Þ
where
Kα x0; xαð Þ ¼
Aϕexp½iπðx20 cot ϕ2x0xαcscϕþx2α cot ϕÞ; if αa2n
δ x0xαð Þ; if αa4n
δ x0þxαð Þ; if α¼ 4n72
8><
>:
ð6Þ
where x0 denotes the spatial coordinates, xα denotes the coordi-
nates of the α th order domain and
Aϕ ¼ sin ϕ
 1=2exp  iπsgn ϕ
 
4
þ iϕ
2
 	
; ϕ¼ απ
2
ð7Þ
2.3. Encryption and decryption algorithms
The proposed multiple-image encryption method is based on
the cascaded FrFT. The schematic diagram of the encryption
process is shown in Fig. 1. Considering that there are m images
to be encrypted, and that f k denotes the k th image, the details
of the encryption procedures can be described as follows:
(1) Each of the images is sent to the phase mask generation
module in succession. The ﬁrst phase mask expðiθkðx; yÞÞ of
each image is generated randomly, and the second one
expðiφkðx; yÞÞ is produced based on the self-coding of the
image using Eqs. (2) and (3).
(2) During phase modulation, all of the phase masks expðiφkðx; yÞÞ
are modulated into one single phase functionG
G¼ exp i
Xm
k ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞ

 
ð8Þ
During this process, some additional keys that are used during
the decryption of each phase mask are required. However, in
Fig. 1. Diagram of the encryption process.
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references [17–19], the additional keys are generated by
expðiϑkðx; yÞÞ ¼ exp i
Xm
d ¼ 1;dak φdðx; yÞ

 
ð9Þ
Then, G is encrypted into the ciphertext image using various
schemes. However, we found that the additional keys can be
used to obtain the phase mask expðiφkðx; yÞÞ using an equation
set without any other keys
ϑ1ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 2 φdðx; yÞ
ϑ2ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 1;da2 φdðx; yÞ
ϑ3ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 1;da3 φdðx; yÞ
⋮
ϑmðx; yÞ ¼
Pm1
d ¼ 1 φdðx; yÞ
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð10Þ
In this equation set, ϑ1ðx; yÞ; ϑ2ðx; yÞ;⋯; ϑmðx; yÞ are known.
There are m equations and m unknown variables (i.e., the
variables φ1ðx; yÞ; φ2ðx; yÞ;⋯; φmðx; yÞ can be directly deter-
mined without G); this indicates that the next encryption
process designed to protect G is insigniﬁcant. We can make
improvements to Eq. (10) to help solve this problem: a random
term can be added somewhere in the equation set. For instance,
we can place a random term into the ﬁrst equation of the
equation set
ϑ1ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 2 φdðx; yÞþrandðx; yÞ
ϑ2ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 1;da2 φdðx; yÞ
ϑ3ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 1;da3 φdðx; yÞ
⋮
ϑmðx; yÞ ¼
Pm1
d ¼ 1 φdðx; yÞ
8>>>><
>>>>:
ð11Þ
Eq. (11) thus has inﬁnite solutions. During the procedure of
decryption, there is no need to determine randðx; yÞ. The private
key expðiφkðx; yÞÞ can be obtained using the simultaneous
equations, which can be shown as
ϑ1ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 2 φdðx; yÞþrandðx; yÞ
ϑ2ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 1;da2 φdðx; yÞ
ϑ3ðx; yÞ ¼
Pm
d ¼ 1;da3 φdðx; yÞ
⋮
ϑmðx; yÞ ¼
Pm1
d ¼ 1 φdðx; yÞ
G¼ expðiPmk ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞÞ
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
ð12Þ
(3) Because exp i
Pm
k ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞ
 
is a periodic function with a
period of 2π,
Pm
k ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞ can be from π to π. Now, we
introduce a one-way binary phase modulation expðiπγðx; yÞÞ
to make
Pm
k ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞ have a positive amplitude; this
allows it to be captured by optical detection. γðx; yÞ is
generated by
γðx; yÞ ¼
1
Pm
k ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞo0
0
Pm
k ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞ40
(
ð13Þ
Now,
Pm
k ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞ can be expressed asXm
k ¼ 1 φkðx; yÞ ¼ h0ðx; yÞexpðiπγðx; yÞÞ ð14Þ
As shown in Fig. 1, the amplitude h0ðx; yÞ is then used as the
input to the cascaded FrFT system.
(4) Then, h0ðx; yÞ is ﬁrstly multiplied by the random phase mask
expðiθ1ðx; yÞÞ and transformed to a complex function using the
FrFT with a fractional order α1. The complex function can be
written as
h1ðx; yÞexpðiξ1ðx; yÞÞ ¼ Fα1 ðh0ðx; yÞexpðiθ1ðx; yÞÞÞ ð15Þ
where Fα1 denotes the α1  order FrFT, h1ðx; yÞ is used as the
input of the next encryption process, and the phase ξ1ðx; yÞ is
used as the decryption key. The amplitude h1ðx; yÞ and the
phase ξ1ðx; yÞ can be extracted by the operators h1ðx; yÞexp

ðiξ1ðx; yÞÞj and argfh1ðx; yÞexpðiξ1ðx; yÞÞg, respectively.
(5) Similarly, the amplitude h1ðx; yÞ is then multiplied by the
random phase mask expðiθ2ðx; yÞÞ and transformed into a
complex function by the FrFT with a fractional order α2. The
result can be written as
h2ðx; yÞexpðiξ2ðx; yÞÞ ¼ Fα2 ðh1ðx; yÞexpðiθ2ðx; yÞÞÞ ð16Þ
Then, the amplitude h2ðx; yÞ and the phase ξ2ðx; yÞ can be
calculated.
(6) After the cascaded process repeatsm times, we obtain the ﬁnal
amplitude hmðx; yÞ and the last decryption key ξmðx; yÞ. The
amplitude hmðx; yÞ is the ﬁnal ciphertext image.
The decryption procedure is described in Fig. 2, which is
similar to the encryption procedure but in the reverse order.
The following shows the primary steps of the decryption
process:
(1) During decryption, a complex function hm1ðx; yÞexpðiθmðx; yÞÞ
can be obtained using the reversed FrFT with a fractional
Fig. 2. Diagram of the decryption process.
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order αm and the decryption key ξmðx; yÞ, which can be
expressed as:
hm1ðx; yÞexpðiθmðx; yÞÞ ¼ F α1 ðhmðx; yÞexpðiξmðx; yÞÞÞ ð17Þ
Then, the amplitude hm1ðx; yÞ and the phase expðiθmðx; yÞÞ can
be determined.
(2) In the same way, expðiθ1ðx; yÞÞ; expðiθ2ðx; yÞÞ;⋯; exp
ðiθm1ðx; yÞÞ and h0ðx; yÞ are easily obtained.
(3) Finally, the phase functions expðiφ1ðx; yÞÞ; expðiφ2ðx; yÞÞ;⋯;
expðiφmðx; yÞÞ can be calculated by Eqs. (12) and (14).
(4) In the phase mask combination module, each of the original
images can be reconstructed using Eq. (4) as
f kðx; yÞ ¼ expðiφkðx; yÞÞþexpðiðθkðx; yÞÞ
 : ð18Þ
From the above description of the encryption and decryption
processes, it is found that the phase functions expðiθkðx; yÞÞ can be
used as the encryption keys to encrypt the interim mask h0ðx; yÞ
into the noise-like ciphertext image, which is different than the
process of the inverse cascaded FrFT. Simultaneously, the phase
functions ξmðx; yÞ produced during encryption are only used as the
decryption keys. The keys for encryption are different from those
used for decryption (i.e., the cryptosystem is asymmetric). In
addition, the techniques of self-coding and phase truncation break
the linearity of the cryptosystem, which produce a high resistance
to various types of potential attacks. Particularly, the trapdoor one-
way function is also considered here to test this asymmetric
cryptosystem. Unlike the asymmetric algorithm proposed in
[24,25], each of the random phase functions expðiθkðx; yÞÞ is an
indivisible part of the corresponding original image. Although
expðiθkðx; yÞÞ is the encryption key, it is still useful after encryption
has ﬁnished, which signiﬁcantly improves the utilization of the
keys and also enhances the security of the cryptosystem. As
shown, this method has no complex iterative process. Therefore,
this scheme has a lower complexity and a higher processing speed.
3. Numerical simulation and security analysis
Without a loss of generality, the three images shown in Fig. 3
are used in the simulations performed in this study. The fractional
orders α1;α2; and α3 are set to 0.234, 0.345, 0.111, respectively, and
the results of the encryption and decryption processes are shown
in Fig. 4. Fig. 4(a) shows the ciphertext image, while Fig. 4(b)–
(d) show the decrypted images with their keys.
Based on the image “Lena,” Fig. 5(a)–(h) show the decrypted
images using the incorrect keys; Fig. 5(a)–(c) display the decrypted
images using the incorrect fractional orders α1 ¼ 0:239;α2 ¼ 0:35;
and α3 ¼ 0:116, respectively; Fig. 5(d)–(g) show the decrypted
images using the incorrect phases ξ1ðx; yÞ,ξ2ðx; yÞ, ξ3ðx; yÞ and
θ1ðx; yÞ; and Fig. 5(h) shows the decrypted image using the
incorrect γðx; yÞ. Similar results can be obtained with the other
images.
During the numerical simulations, we can encrypt any number
of images using the method described above. However, it is known
that the DRPE beneﬁts from its optical implementation, producing
signiﬁcant advantages, such as the potential for parallel proces-
sing, high precision and spatial resolution. Therefore, the max-
imum number of images that the optical system can receive
should be investigated further, as in [27].
3.1. Sensitivity analysis
To determine the sensitivity of the fractional orders, the
decryption procedure is processed by varying one fractional order
while the others held constant. The mean square error (MSE) of
Fig. 3. Three plain images for encryption: (a) “Lena”; (b) “Barb”; and (c) “Baboon.”.
Fig. 4. (a) Ciphertext image; (b) decrypted “Lena;” (c) decrypted “Barb;” and (d) decrypted “Baboon.”.
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multiple images [19] is used to evaluate the quality of the
decryption results and can be deﬁned as:
MSE¼ 1
P
XP
k ¼ 1
MSEk ð19Þ
where MSEk ¼ ð1=M  NÞ
PM
m ¼ 1
PN
n ¼ 1
f kðm;nÞ f 0kðm;nÞ
 2, in which
f kðm;nÞ denotes the k th original image, and f 0kðm;nÞ denotes
the corresponding decrypted result.
The curves that describe the MSE of multiple images and the
deviation of the fractional orders are shown in Fig. 6, in which the
deviation ranges from 0.2 to 0.2 with a step size of 0.01. The MSE
value becomes nearly zero only when the order is correct; when
the order has a slight deviation, the MSE value increases signiﬁ-
cantly. In practical applications, the decryption results cannot be
recognized if the deviation of the orders are larger than 0.005.
Fig. 5(a)–(c) show the decrypted image “Lena” when the deviation
of the orders is 0.005.
Next, the sensitivity of the encryption keys ξ1ðx; yÞ,ξ2ðx; yÞ, and
ξ3ðx; yÞ are analyzed. If ξmðx; yÞ were perturbed within a certain
range, the ﬂuctuated key ξ0mðx; yÞ could be denoted as
ξ0mðx; yÞ ¼ ξmðx; yÞþdnΔξðx; yÞ ð20Þ
where d is a ﬂuctuant coefﬁcient in [1,–1], andΔξðx; yÞ is a random
phase function in ½π; π. The relationship curves between the
MSE of multiple images and the ﬂuctuant coefﬁcient are shown in
Fig. 7. When the MSE value is more than 6000, the decrypted
images cannot be recognized. From Fig. 7, it is found that if the
ﬂuctuant coefﬁcient is equal to or greater than 0.3, the MSE value
is always greater than 6000.
3.2. Statistical analysis
In this section, a statistical analysis is shown in two aspects: the
histograms of different groups of images' ciphertext image are
tested; and the correlations of the adjacent pixels of the original
images and their corresponding ciphertext image are calculated and
compared. Fig. 8 shows another group of images. Fig. 9(a) and
(b) show the ciphertext image's histograms of the original images
and Fig. 8, respectively, which are nearly uniform. Therefore, the
histograms of different ciphertext images have similar distributions.
Fig. 5. Decrypted “Lena” using the (a) incorrect α1; (b) incorrect α2; (c) incorrect α3; (d) incorrect ξ1; (e) incorrect ξ2; (f) incorrect ξ3; (g) incorrect θ1; and (h) incorrect γ.
Fig. 6. MSE versus the deviation of the fractional orders (a) α1; (b) α2; and (c) α3.
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To evaluate the self-correlations of adjacent pixels, 4000 pairs
of pixels are randomly selected in the vertical, horizontal, and
diagonal directions from the original images, the decryption keys,
and the ciphertext image. The correlation coefﬁcients of the two
adjacent pixels then can be calculated as
Cor¼
PN
i ¼ 1ðxixÞðyiyÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPN
i ¼ 1 ðxixÞ2Þ
PN
i ¼ 1 ðyiyÞ2Þ


r ð21Þ
where x¼ 1=NPNi ¼ 1 xi and y¼ 1=NPNi ¼ 1 yi. Table 1 shows the
results, which indicate that the correlations of two adjacent pixels
in the original images are signiﬁcant while that of the ciphertext
and the decryption keys are quite low. The results suggest that an
illegal user cannot obtain any valid information based on the
statistical property.
3.3. Noise attack analysis
To evaluate the proposed method's robustness against a noise
attack, the ciphertext image is added to a Gaussian random noise
in the following way:
C0 ¼ Cð1þλGÞ ð22Þ
where C is the ciphertext image, C0 is the noise-affected ciphertext
image, λ denotes a coefﬁcient that represents the noise strength,
and G is a standard Gaussian random noise. Fig. 10 a, b, c and d
display the decrypted image “Lena” when the coefﬁcient λ is set to
0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1.0, respectively. It is shown that the encrypted
results can be easily recognized, although the strength of the noise
is increasing. Similar results can be obtained using the other
images.
Fig. 7. MSE versus the ﬂuctuant phase keys (a) ξ1ðx; yÞ; (b) ξ2ðx; yÞ; and (c) ξ3ðx; yÞ.
Fig. 8. (a) “Peppers;” (b) “Frog;” and (c) “Boat.”.
Fig. 9. (a) Histograms of the original images' ciphertext image; and (b) another group of images' ciphertext image.
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3.4. Occlusion attack analysis
The robustness of the proposed method against occlusion is
used to evaluate how the method manages a loss of data in the
ciphertext image. Fig. 11(a) and (c) show the situation when
occlusions occur at the left-top corner and the left-bottom corner
of the ciphertext image. The ciphertext image is half-destroyed
from the left side, and the lost data are replaced with zeros in the
simulation. The decryption process is performed with all of the
correct keys. Fig. 11(b) and (d) show the corresponding decrypted
“Lena,” from which the primary information of the original image
can be recognized visually. The proposed cryptosystem thus has
sufﬁcient robustness against an occlusion attack. Similar results
can be obtained using the other recovered images.
Table 1
Correction coefﬁcients.
Correlation coefﬁcient Original images Encrypted images
Lena Barb Baboon Ciphertext ξ1 ξ2 ξ3
Horizontal direction 0.9745 0.9075 0.9559 0.0167 0.0186 0.0165 0.0091
Vertical direction 0.9687 0.9330 0.9438 0.0115 0.0012 0.0035 0.0019
Diagonal direction 0.9411 0.8922 0.9232 0.0174 0.0111 0.0131 0.0021
Fig. 10. Decrypted image “Lena” with the strength coefﬁcients (a) λ¼ 0:4; (b) λ¼ 0:6; (c) λ¼ 0:8; and (d) λ¼ 1:0.
Fig. 11. Ciphertext image that is half-destroyed from the left side: (a) destroyed left-top corner; (b) the corresponding decrypted result; (c) destroyed left-bottom corner; and
(d) the corresponding decrypted result.
Fig. 12. (a) Decrypted “Lena;” (b) “Barb;” (c) and “Baboon.”.
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3.5. Potential attack analysis
The cipher-only attack, the known-plaintext attack, the chosen-
plaintext attack, and the chosen-ciphertext attack are four con-
ventional attacks that are commonly used; of these, the chosen-
plain attack is the most threatening. It is claimed that the
cryptosystem can resist the other three types of attacks if it can
resist the chosen plain attack [28]. For the proposed multiple-
image encryption scheme, it is assumed that an illegal user has
obtained the fractional orders α1;α2; and α3, can encrypt a group
of fake images and has obtained their decryption keys
ξ1ðx; yÞ,ξ2ðx; yÞ, ξ3ðx; yÞ and γ1ðx; yÞ. The illegal user then utilizes
the obtained keys to decrypt the original images. Fig. 8(a)–
(c) show the fake images. The decryption keys ξ1ðx; yÞ,ξ2ðx; yÞ,
ξ3ðx; yÞ and γ1ðx; yÞ are obtained after the encryption procedure has
ﬁnished. Fig. 12(a)–(c) display the decrypted results, from which
any information about the original images “Lena”, “Barb”, and
“Baboon” cannot be obtained. The results demonstrate that the
proposed encryption scheme is sufﬁciently robust to resist all
forms of potential attacks.
4. Conclusions
In this study, an asymmetric multiple-image cryptosystem
based on the cascaded FrFT is proposed. In this system, each
original image is ﬁrstly separated into two phase masks: a random
phase, and the other is produced by the self-coding of the original
image. A selection of random phases is used as the encryption
keys, while the other phases are combined into a complex matrix.
Then, the complex matrix is transformed into a real-valued
ciphertext image using the cascaded FrFT. Because the cryptosys-
tem is asymmetric, the decryption keys that are generated in the
encryption process are not identical to the encryption keys. Unlike
other asymmetric cryptosystems, the encryption key is an indivi-
sible part of the corresponding original image, and these keys are
also useful during decryption; the original images cannot be
recovered unless all encryption and decryption keys are known.
Numerical simulations have veriﬁed the feasibility and security of
the proposed cryptosystem.
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